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In his recent comment, Di Lollo (2014)
criticizes my proposal (Põder, 2013)
that the attentional gating model
(Reeves and Sperling, 1986; Sperling and
Weichselgartner, 1995) might be the most
simple and reasonable explanation for
the results of object substitution masking
(OSM) experiments. He argues that OSM
cannot be explained without a reentrant
hypotheses-testing mechanism (as pro-
posed in Di Lollo et al., 2000). A closer
look at his arguments reveals that they are
partly based on an inaccurate interpre-
tation of my study, and partly, on some
highly problematic assumptions about
visual processing.
The goal of my study (Põder, 2013)
was to understand the mechanisms behind
the results of a typical OSM experiment
with varied duration of masker and set-
size. There were two main points in my
study that are relevant in the present con-
text. First, I analyzed the computational
model (CMOS) proposed by Di Lollo et al.
(2000) and found it to be identical with
the attentional gating model, which has no
direct relationship with any kind of “reen-
trant processing.” Second, I proposed an
improved mechanism of attention to be
combined with this model (or other pos-
sible masking models). I have never pro-
posed or tested any newmodel of masking.
Di Lollo (2014) seems to have a rather
subjective view of my study. He criticizes
something named Põder’s feed-forward
account (or model) of OSM, which is sup-
posedly based on two assumptions: reduc-
tion of signal to noise ratio (SNR) as a
result of integrated noise from the masker,
and delayed deployment of attention. Both
assumptions are declared to be wrong or at
least unjustified.
As I mentioned, I have not built a
new model of OSM but just reinterpreted
Di Lollo et al.’s (2000) CMOS. Therefore,
these assumptions can only be the assump-
tions underlying CMOS, and actually, they
are. I believe that CMOS was a reason-
ably good model for OSM experiments
and that its main assumptions cannot be
fundamentally wrong. However, Di Lollo
(2014) missed some possibly important
details. In CMOS, SNR was reduced not
only because of accumulating “noise” from
the masker but also because of decay of the
target signal. Neither Di Lollo et al. (2000)
nor Põder (2013) supposed that SNR is
proportional (or inversely proportional)
to the duration of the masker.
The model that was tested in my study
tried to explain the set-size effects bet-
ter than the simple attention deployment
mechanism used in CMOS. My model
assumes that the set-size effect is caused
by an initial stage of divided attention. In
this model masking per se is independent
of set-size. A similar idea about the invari-
ance of masking to set-size was indepen-
dently discovered by Argyropoulos et al.
(2013). My model with divided attention
goes a bit further and proposes a plausi-
ble explanation for the observed set size
effects.
Having explained away the set-size
effect, a simple masking effect remains. In
my study (Põder, 2013), I did not attempt
to reveal its exact mechanisms. I indi-
cated that the combination of the decay
of the target signal, integration of the
masker signal, and a delayed attention as
implemented in CMOS (Di Lollo et al.,
2000) might do the job. However, there are
many other possibilities. After the removal
of the burden to explain set-size effects,
the classic models of masking (Weisstein,
1968; Bridgeman, 1971; Francis, 1997) that
were analyzed in Francis and Hermens
(2002) become fully applicable for OSM
(note that the unsatisfactory modeling
of attention/set-size effects was the main
problem with these models; Di Lollo et al.,
2002). Of course, Di Lollo’s reentrant
hypotheses-testing idea can be included
in the candidate list too, as well as
Bachmann’s (1994) non-specific amplifi-
cation idea. Hopefully, future studies will
be able to discriminate between these
models.
Although the set-size effect has been
quite convincingly separated from the
masking effect, some role of attention in
OSM is still not excluded. In a recent
study, Pilling et al. (2014) found a modest
effect of spatial pre-cueing in one out of
the five experiments. Up to now, nobody
has explained away the position uncer-
tainty and pre-cueing effects reported in
earlier studies (Enns and Di Lollo, 1997;
Neill et al., 2002; Tata and Giaschi, 2004;
Luiga and Bachmann, 2007). If attention
is still important then the models of mask-
ing developed by Smith et al. (Smith and
Wolfgang, 2004; Smith et al., 2009) or by
Bridgeman (2007) may be considered.
Di Lollo (2014) mainly argues against
a CMOS-like masking account, but appar-
ently supposes that any kind of essen-
tially feed-forward model cannot explain
masking with a sparse trailing masker.
The majority of his arguments are based
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on a quite strange view on the visual
system. Di Lollo (2014) seems to ignore
the hierarchical nature of visual process-
ing and assume that all the masking-
related processes should occur at some
low-level retinotopic layer. Therefore, only
retinotopic picture-level noise, integra-
tion, and masking are possible. The real
visual system consists of at least 4–5 (pos-
sibly more) processing levels (e.g., DeYoe
and van Essen, 1988; Riesenhuber and
Poggio, 1999). The target and masker sig-
nals are processed and temporally and spa-
tially integrated throughout this hierarchy.
Thus, the “noise” from irrelevant stimuli
may interact with relevant signals at any
level of processing. The higher levels are
increasingly invariant to spatial positions
and combine all visual features including
motion. It is therefore not surprising at
all that the dots far from the target, or
a masker that was retinotopically moved
away from the target location (Lleras and
Moore, 2003), can still interact at higher
object recognition levels. Note that the
higher-level masking does not need any-
thing like sending perceptual hypotheses
back to the lower levels.
A large part of Di Lollo’s (2014) cri-
tique is directed against using SNR in the
models of OSM (although the idea itself
was introduced by Di Lollo et al., 2000).
Di Lollo (2014) argues that a noisy rep-
resentation of visual objects is not con-
sistent with the phenomenal experience
of not seeing them as noisy pictures;
and with clearly different effects of the
external pixel noise compared to four-
dot masker. His arguments apparently
challenge some points of traditional psy-
chophysics. In usual psychophysical mod-
els (e.g., Macmillan and Creelman, 2005),
noise is a random trial-by-trial variabil-
ity of internal representations that causes
incorrect perceptual decisions. This noise
can make a letter A look like a letter B,
or like a chicken, or like a blank screen,
in some trials. We can manipulate this
noise (or SNR) by varying stimulus con-
trast, size, or exposure duration, present-
ing distractors, or forward or backward
maskers, pre-cueing attention, simultane-
ous eye movements, etc., besides adding
external pixel noise. There is no reason
to suppose that the decision-level noise
should be visible and look like noise within
a single image.
New studies have forced Di Lollo
and colleagues to make some changes
to their theory. The original account of
OSM (Di Lollo et al., 2000) was heav-
ily based on both reentrant hypotheses
testing and deployment of attention. The
Argyropoulos et al. (2013) results indi-
cated that something is wrong with this
theory. The simplest way out was to leave
out attention. However, attention had a
key role in CMOS and in the predictions
related to the Di Lollo et al. (2000) theory.
Jannati et al. (2013) found an innovative
solution. Nominally, they removed atten-
tion but attributed its properties to “reen-
trant processing.” In the original model
(Di Lollo et al., 2000), the reentrant pro-
cessing was supposed to be perpetual gen-
eration and testing perceptual hypotheses
with periodicity of about 13ms. In their
new account (Jannati et al., 2013), the
reentrance “arrives” at about 80–120ms
after stimulus onset, a typical delay of
focusing spatial attention (e.g., Cheal and
Lyon, 1991). Overall, their revised theory
still follows the attentional gating logic of
CMOS. At the same time, they claim that
their experiment falsifies the attentional
gating account of OSM. A closer look at
their arguments reveals that their descrip-
tion of the “attentional gating model” does
not contain attention at all. It is not sur-
prising that such a model cannot fit any
(old or new) experimental results.
In conclusion, I would describe the
present situation as follows. The atten-
tional gating idea effectively explained the
effects of attention and simplified the
problem of OSM tremendously. Now, one
may take a single target stimulus with a
common-onset masker and present them
at a fixed position of the visual field,
with full attention available, and try to
observe OSM. There is a chance that Di
Lollo (or somebody else) can demonstrate
the action of reentrant hypotheses-testing
mechanism in that simple experiment. It
would be an interesting and surprising (at
least for me) finding. But it would not con-
tradict my attentional gating account of
OSM experiments with set-size variation.
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